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While copyright infringement is a legal wrong, plagiarism is a 
breach of academic and market practices.  However, few authors 
of literary works truly understand the difference between the two.  
Copyright law seeks to protect economic interests in an underlying 
work, while plagiarism—and in countries where moral rights are 
robust, associated legal rights—protect the integrity of the work 
and the author’s claim to the work.  The digital age has refocused 
                                                                                                             
*  Baker Botts Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Intellectual Property and 
Information Law, University of Houston Law Center. 
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attention on the kinds of claims an author or copyright holder 
might make with respect to unauthorized uses of a literary work.  
The ease with which a digital work may be cut and pasted, or 
generally repurposed, creates a need to reconsider the types of 
legal and market wrongs that arise with respect to digitally 
distributed literary works.  Drawing on observations from the 
digital publishing industry, this Article proposes a taxonomy of 
borrowing from existing works that serves to clarify the kinds of 
borrowing that should be legally and economically tolerated as 
contrasted with conduct that may be regarded as wrongful.  It is 
the hope that this taxonomy assists in the development of both 
digital copyright law and market approaches to acceptable versus 
unacceptable borrowing in the digital publishing sphere. 
 
“Plagiarism’s bad enough,” Goss said. “But from a 
girl? I can’t believe you’d plagiarize from a girl.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Today’s Copyright law derives from the needs of the nascent 
publishing industry centuries ago in Europe following the advent 
of the printing press.2  Moral rights law—in countries where such 
laws are robust—derives from the needs of creators of artistic and 
literary works to be protected with respect to the authorial integrity 
of their works.3  Plagiarism, while not a legal wrong, is a concept 
that also protects a creator’s right to be identified as the author of a 
work, and to prevent unattributed misappropriation of the work by 
others.4  All of these regimes relate to authors’ rights in their 
original creations.  They all facilitate and protect creators of 
original works from unauthorized misappropriation, but they do so 
                                                                                                             
1 TOBIAS WOLFF, OLD SCHOOL, 144 (2003). 
2 See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 3–5 (5th ed. 2010) 
(detailing the invention of the printing press and the enactment of the first copyright 
statute in the United Kingdom, the Statute of Anne of 1710). 
3 See Jacqueline Lipton, Moral Rights and Supernatural Fiction, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 537, 543–45 (2011) (describing the bases of European moral 
rights law). 
4 See infra Part I.D. 
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in different ways, and in different contexts.  The interplay between 
them is often complicated, and is poorly understood by most 
creators of artistic and literary works. 
The advent of the digital age creates greater pressures than ever 
on those involved in the creation and dissemination of literary 
works to ensure that they understand the contours of what are 
acceptable versus unacceptable uses of existing material.  While no 
writer is an island and all new works rely to some extent on 
borrowing from works that have predated them, there must be 
some boundaries provided by the law and market norms with 
respect to when borrowing is appropriate and when it should be 
characterized as wrongful.  These boundaries may be in different 
places depending on the field of endeavor.  For example, 
borrowing from scientific works to further fields of research and 
scholarship may be more acceptable than borrowing from purely 
fictional works whose main value is entertainment.  It is also likely 
that the nature and type of borrowing sanctioned in the literary 
field generally will differ in many ways from what is permissible 
in other fields of creative endeavor such as movies, music, games, 
and the like. 
This Article attempts to formulate a taxonomy of digital 
borrowing in the field of literary works.  The idea is to draw from 
current conduct in the digital publishing industry in order to 
ascertain what might be regarded as acceptable borrowing and how 
it might contrast with conduct that is either a legal or a moral 
wrong, or both.  In particular, it teases out the elements of 
copyright and plagiarism that have the most impact on the 
determination of wrongfulness in different contexts.  While the 
Article suggests no major law reforms, it advocates a more 
nuanced approach to applying existing regulatory principles. 
Part I briefly considers the differences (and similarities) 
between copyright infringement, moral rights infringement (in 
jurisdictions where available), and plagiarism.  Part II articulates 
the proposed taxonomy of borrowing that might assist the 
development of rules, norms, and market practices that better 
address the concerns of those involved in digital publishing 
markets.  Part III draws from the taxonomy to outline ways in 
which laws and market practices could better address the concerns 
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of authors and copyright holders.  Part IV concludes with 
suggestions about useful future directions in the regulation of 
digital publishing. 
I. LEGAL AND OTHER RULES RELATING TO UNAUTHORIZED 
BORROWING 
A. Copyright, Moral Rights, and Plagiarism 
As noted in the Introduction, there are three main sets of rules 
that regulate unauthorized borrowing: copyright, moral rights, and 
plagiarism.  The former two categories are legal rules while the 
latter derives from market norms and institutional honor codes.  
While these regimes apply to all kinds of creative works—
including musical works, artistic works, sculptural works, movies, 
and games—this Article focuses on their application to literary 
works, predominantly commercial and literary fiction.  However, 
unauthorized borrowing of academic and scientific works is 
considered to the extent that imperatives about digital borrowing of 
these works differ from those relating to fictional works.  It should 
also be noted that in the context of this discussion “unauthorized” 
borrowing does not necessarily equate to “wrongful” conduct.  
“Unauthorized” simply means not authorized by the creator of the 
work or the copyright holder, or both.  “Wrongful” suggests a legal 
or moral wrong.  “Unauthorized” conduct is not always wrongful 
as the following discussion demonstrates. 
The robustness and availability of each of the three sets of rules 
depends to a significant extent on context and, particularly in the 
case of moral rights, jurisdiction.  While moral rights are very 
robust in most countries of the European Union, they are much 
weaker in the United States; some would argue, however, that 
other aspects of American law—such as the laws relating to 
trademarks and unfair competition—fill in gaps left by the failure 
to adopt broader-based moral rights legislation.5 
The interconnections between copyright, moral rights, and 
plagiarism may also be a little context- or jurisdiction-specific, 
                                                                                                             
5 See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 390–91 (detailing areas of existing American law said 
to encompass the equivalent protections to moral rights law). 
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although generally Copyright law concerns itself predominantly 
with economic rewards, while moral rights and plagiarism have 
more to do with the integrity of the work and the author’s right to 
be identified with the work.  The following discussion briefly 
explains how each of the three sets of rules operates, and the 
relationship between them.  Then the discussion turns to the 
proposed taxonomy of borrowing and how each of the rules may or 




The law does not excuse copyright infringement, no 
matter how fulsome the infringer’s 
acknowledgment of his copying; but the 
acknowledgment will exonerate him of any charge 
of plagiarism.  Or at least should—because judges 
will sometimes call copyright infringers 
“plagiarists” though there is no concealment.  This 
loose usage erases what is distinctive about 
plagiarism, though it illustrates how the right of 
copyright has made copying a suspicious activity.6 
 
1. Exclusive Rights 
While a detailed discussion of the operation of Copyright law 
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is necessary for the reader to 
understand the basics to contrast copyright infringement with other 
sanctions related to unauthorized borrowing.  Though copyright 
infringement will often overlap with a moral rights violation and/or 
plagiarism, each set of rules has a distinct basis and they do not 
always coincide in practice.  Copyright is largely concerned with 
unauthorized borrowing of the fixed literal expression of an 
existing work.7  Thus, technically it should only apply to taking the 
                                                                                                             
6 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 17 (2007). 
7 See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 78 (“The Copyright Act has codified the longstanding, 
judicially evolved rule that copyright protects the expression of an idea but not the idea 
itself.”). 
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exact words of the original author without permission, rather than 
the underlying ideas.  However, because the test for infringement 
utilizes a conception of “substantial similarity” between the 
defendant’s work and that of the plaintiff, courts will take into 
account some degree of abstraction.8  It is sometimes difficult for 
courts to establish when a copyist has taken the original author’s 
idea versus her original expression for copyright infringement 
purposes.9  Thus, the creation of a work that does not literally copy 
the exact expression of the original, but reproduces its noteworthy 
concepts (characters, setting, plot points) may also amount to 
copyright infringement.10 
The copyright statutes in most countries give exclusive rights 
to the creator of a work.11  These are property rights—or at least 
property-like—that can be transferred to others.12  Thus, the 
creator of the work is not necessarily the copyright holder.  
Copyright protection generally subsists for the term of the author’s 
life plus seventy years thereafter.13  The exclusive rights provided 
by copyright include the right to prevent unauthorized 
copying/reproduction, public dissemination, and public distribution 
of a work.14  In the United States, Copyright law also preserves to 
the copyright holder the right to make and control the production 
and dissemination of “derivative works.”15 
“Derivative work” has been defined by Congress as: 
                                                                                                             
8 Id. at 426–27 (describing the “abstractions” test in applying the concept of 
“substantial similarity”). 
9 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 13 (“The line between idea and expression is often 
indistinct.  How loose must a paragraph be to escape infringing?”). 
10 Id. (“Copying a generic plot or a stock character from a novelist, or historical facts 
from a historian, is not copyright infringement.  But copying details of plot . . . and of 
character could well be.”). 
11 See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 293–94 (describing the exclusive rights given to 
copyright holders in the United States under 17 U.S.C. § 106). 
12 17 U.S.C. § 204(2) (2012) (formalities required for transfers of copyright interests); 
see also LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 216–18. 
13 See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 226 (“For most works created after January 1, 1978, 
the copyright term is measured by the life of the author plus 70 years.”); see also id. at 
239 (providing a detailed table of copyright terms for all works under the Copyright Act). 
14 17 U.S.C. § 106 (exclusive rights of copyright holders in the United States). 
15 Id. § 106(2) (rights in derivative works). 
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[A] work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted.  A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications 
which, as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship, is a “derivative work.”16 
Derivative works include prequels, sequels, and retellings of 
existing works.  Thus, they are highly implicated in the fanfiction17 
community.  “Fanfiction” has exploded since the advent of the 
Internet, even though it existed prior to the digital age.18  It 
involves creating unauthorized sequels, prequels and retellings of 
existing works by fans, generally not for any monetary reward but 
purely for the enjoyment of participating in the fandom.19  Most 
fanfiction might be described as derivative works.20  However, 
                                                                                                             
16 Id. § 101 (definition of “derivative work”). 
17 See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common 
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 655 (1997) (“‘Fan fiction,’ broadly speaking, is any 
kind of written creativity that is based on an identifiable segment of popular culture, such 
as a television show, and is not produced as ‘professional’ writing.”); see also Fan 
Fiction, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fan_fiction (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) 
(“Fan fiction, or fanfiction (often abbreviated to fanfic, or simply fic), is a broadly 
defined fan labor term for stories about characters or settings written by fans of the 
original work, rather than by the original creator.  Works of fan fiction are rarely 
commissioned or authorized by the original work’s owner, creator, or publisher; also, 
they are almost never professionally published.  Due to these works not being published, 
stories often contain a disclaimer stating that the creator of the work owns none of the 
original characters.  Fan fiction is defined by being both related to its subject’s canonical 
fictional universe and simultaneously existing outside the canon of that universe.  Most 
fan fiction writers assume that their work is read primarily by other fans, and therefore 
tend to presume that their readers have knowledge of the canon universe (created by a 
professional writer) in which their works are based.”). 
18 See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 655 (“Fan fiction and organized media fandom have 
been traced to the second season of Star Trek in 1967.”). 
19 See id. at 657 (“The ethos of fandom is one of community, of shared journeys to 
understanding and enjoyment.”); id. at 664 (“Fan fiction is mostly nonprofit, and on the 
Web no one has to pay to read it.”). 
20 Some of it may also amount to a reproduction or copy of an original work under 
broad conceptions of “copying” utilized by judges applying the “substantial similarity” 
test with respect to distinctive characters and settings. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 17, 
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much of it is probably excusable under the fair use doctrine of 
Copyright law.  The role of fanfiction as an unauthorized, but 
potentially socially valuable, form of digital borrowing is 
considered in more detail in Part II infra.  Interestingly, many 
authors of works that give rise to active fanfiction communities do 
not appear to understand the legal definition of a derivative work, 
nor the application of Copyright law to derivative works. 
For example, bestselling young adult fantasy author Maggie 
Stiefvater makes the following comments about fanfiction on her 
website: 
I consider [fanfiction] a pretty steep compliment.  
So long as I’m acknowledged as the creator of the 
original characters and no money is being made on 
the derivative fiction, fanfic away!  I am not, 
however, a fan of derivative works—i.e., fanfic 
where my writing is taken word for word with only 
the characters or minor details changed.  Please 
don’t plagiarize!21 
Ms. Stiefvater’s description of a “derivative work” as a story 
where her writing is taken word for word with only minor details 
changed is a far cry from the legal definition of derivative work 
found in the copyright legislation.  The legal definition is much 
broader than Ms. Stiefvater’s conception.  Additionally, her final 
sentence conflates the creation of unauthorized derivative works 
with plagiarism, which is also incorrect.  While a derivative work 
may or may not identify the author as the creator of the original 
work, a plagiarized work generally will not identify the author of 
the original work.  As Judge Posner has written, “Concealment is 
at the heart of plagiarism.”22  The plagiarist conceals the identity of 
the author while the copyright infringer may or may not do so. 
                                                                                                             
at 658–59 (“Fan fiction does not involve pure copying.  It might infringe on a creator’s 
copyright in characters—the unique personalities created to express a concept . . . 
Copyright law . . . expanded its reach beyond duplication to looser forms of borrowing, 
including the use of well-established characters.”). 
21 FAQ, MAGGIE STIEFVATER BLOG, http://maggiestiefvater.com/faq (last visited June 
13, 2014). 
22 POSNER, supra note 6, at 17. 
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2. Fair Use 
Some common misconceptions about copyright infringement 
generally include: (a) if a copyist did not intend to infringe, her 
infringement may be excused; (b) if a copyist made no money, or 
did not intend to profit, from an infringement, the infringement 
will be excused; (c) if the copyist identifies the author of the 
original work, there is no infringement; and (d) remixing, 
repurposing, sampling, and fanfiction do not constitute copyright 
infringement. 
As blanket statements of the law, these assertions are all 
incorrect, although each may be correct in specific cases depending 
on the circumstances.  Taking the assertions in order, copying is a 
strict-liability wrong.23  Thus, a defendant’s intentions are 
immaterial to infringement, although they may be taken into 
account in the determination of damages.24  Financial gain is not an 
element of the infringement action per se, although it is an element 
of the fair use defense.25  Thus, some noncommercial infringement 
may be excused under the fair use doctrine, but a blanket statement 
that noncommercial copying is not an infringement is incorrect. 
The identification of the original author, while socially 
responsible, is not an excuse for infringement.  Infringement 
involves copying and not attribution or lack thereof.  Those issues 
are more relevant to claims involving moral rights infringement (in 
jurisdictions where a right of attribution action is available).26  
They are also relevant to allegations of plagiarism.  Finally, 
conduct like remixing, repurposing, sampling and fanfiction may 
or may not be infringing activities, and may or may not be excused 
under the fair use doctrine depending on the context.  A blanket 
assertion that these activities are always non-infringing or are 
always excused by fair use is incorrect. 
                                                                                                             
23 See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 539. 
24 See id. (“In general, infringement with innocent intent is not a defense to a finding 
of liability.  Outside of one narrowly drawn provision in the Act, infringement of 
copyright is a strict liability rule, where intent of the copier is not relevant in determining 
the fact of liability.”). 
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012) (Commercial motives of the defendant are part of the 
first fair use factor). 
26 See infra Part I.C. 
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As is evident from the above discussion of common 
misconceptions of copyright infringement, many arguments 
relating to non-infringing conduct assume a broad application of 
the fair use defense.  This defense is set out in § 107 of the 
Copyright Act and is problematic in the sense that its application in 
any given case is intended to be flexible.  The advantage of 
flexibility is, of course, that courts are able to adapt the doctrine to 
new contexts such as those arising with new digital technologies 
enabling remixing, sampling and repurposing.  However, the 
downside of flexibility is the uncertainty of a result, which may be 
contrasted with the law in some countries that have a more clearly 
proscribed “fair dealing” doctrine.27 
The American copyright legislation provides that: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such 
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by 
any other means . . . for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright.  In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
                                                                                                             
27 See Rebecca Tushnet, Q&A with Professor Rebecca Tushnet, DEAR AUTHOR BLOG 
(Mar. 21, 2012), http://dearauthor.com/features/essays/qa-with-professor-rebecca-tushnet 
(“U.S. fair use is definitely unusual, though it’s been adopted in Israel and several other 
countries are at least thinking about adopting it.  Outside the U.S., the closest concept is 
generally known as ‘fair dealing.’  Fair dealing varies by country; it generally covers 
quotation and criticism, and some people have argued that at least highly transformative 
fictional works could fall within those categories.  Though I’m not an expert in the area, 
I’ve read some very interesting analysis of recent German case law, for example, 
suggesting that freedom of expression principles justify a broad interpretation of fair 
dealing in the case of critical reuses.”). 
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.28 
While the preamble sets out the kinds of situations typically 
regarded as fair use in the United States, it is not a blanket 
statement that uses of existing works for purposes of criticism, 
comment, news reporting and the like will necessarily be found to 
be a fair use in any given case.  Additionally, there is nothing in 
the preamble that contemplates the kinds of uses that have become 
popular in the digital age including sampling, remixing, 
repurposing, and fanfiction. 
The four fair use factors are the key to determining whether or 
not a defendant’s use of a work is excusable under the doctrine.  
Factors one and four are often given paramount weight by modern 
courts.29  Each of these factors relies to a significant extent on the 
economics of the defendant’s use, and the impact of that use on 
existing or potential markets for the work.  This is probably where 
a lot of the confusion about noncommercial works comes into the 
equation.  Because economic elements are contemplated in fair use 
factors one and four, many borrowers of works assume that 
noncommercial uses are necessarily excused and acceptable under 
Copyright law.  However, as noted above, the fair use factors are 
applied flexibly and even a noncommercial use may amount to a 
copyright infringement. 
While not stated in the statute itself, the first fair use factor has 
come to incorporate a concept of “transformative use.”30  Courts 
have held that where a defendant’s use “transforms” the plaintiff’s 
work by adding new insights or ways of looking at the work, it is 
more likely to be considered a fair use.31  In recent years, cases 
                                                                                                             
28 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
29 See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 481 (“The case law frequently states that [the fourth 
fair use] factor is the single most important element of fair use  . . . . The fourth factor is 
related in one way or another to the other three factors, but perhaps most closely to the 
first factor where presumption of harm arises from commercial use of the copyrighted 
work.”). 
30 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10.13 (2010) (explaining the 
concept of transformative use and its application under the first fair use factor). 
31 See, e.g-, Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 540–41 
(S.D.N.Y 2008) (“Most critical to the inquiry under the first fair use factor is ‘whether 
and to what extent the new work is transformative.’  Specifically, the court asks ‘whether 
the new work merely supersede[s] the objects of the original creation, or instead adds 
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involving digital technology have extended the notion of 
transformative use of the work itself to what might be termed 
transformative functionality of the work, even in cases where the 
defendant may be a profit-making enterprise like the Google 
search engine.32  In a number of cases involving search engines, 
for example, courts have held that even verbatim reproductions of 
entire works in search results may be excused by fair use largely 
because of the ability of search engines to allow easier access to 
works and, in the case of literary works, data mining of those 
works.33 
The application of the notion of transformative use in the 
context of the first fair use factor, along with the application of the 
other fair use factors to various types of digital borrowing are 
considered in more detail in Parts II and III infra.  For the purposes 
of distinguishing the basic elements of copyright infringement 
from those of moral rights infringement and plagiarism within the 
context of this discussion, it is simply necessary to understand that 
Copyright law is a strict liability tort that prevents unauthorized 
reproductions, disseminations, displays and derivative works based 
on preexisting works where the defendant’s conduct is not 
excusable under the fair use defense.34 
C. Moral Rights 
 
The word create . . . derives from the Latin verb 
creo, which means “to give birth to” . . . .  The 
concept that an author “gives birth” to her artistic 
                                                                                                             
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.’  The fair use doctrine seeks to protect a secondary 
work if it ‘adds value to the original if [copyrightable expression in the original work] is 
used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new 
insights and understandings,’ because such a work contributes to the enrichment of 
society.” (citations omitted)). 
32 See id. at 541 (“Courts have found a transformative purpose both where the 
defendant combines copyrighted expression with original expression to produce a new 
creative work, . . . and where the defendant uses a copyrighted work in a different context 
to serve a different function than the original.”). 
33 See Authors Guild Inc. v. Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
34 Other copyright defenses, such as first-sale/exhaustion are not relevant to this 
discussion. 
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creations provides the foundation of the 
insurmountable connection between an author and 
her work.35 
 
Moral rights have not become a large part of American law, 
even though the United States is technically required to implement 
moral rights as a condition of becoming a signatory to the Berne 
Convention.  Some commentators argue that the United States is 
not in compliance with its Berne obligations to implement moral 
rights legislation.36  The United States government’s failure to 
implement additional moral rights legislation outside of the Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990 suggests that it is relying on the current 
pastiche of copyright, trademark, and unfair competition principles 
to provide compliance with the country’s Berne obligations.37 
Because moral rights are not a mainstay of American law, and 
because the author has addressed them in detail in a previous 
Article,38 they are only briefly canvassed here for the purposes of 
distinguishing them from copyright infringement and plagiarism.  
The discussion in Parts II and III refers to areas in which moral 
rights legislation might fill some of the gaps currently existing in 
the American regulatory matrix for protecting authors’ rights.  The 
author of this Article has previously concluded that moral rights 
legislation is not likely to be a particularly effective avenue for 
                                                                                                             
35 ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 13–14 (2010). 
36 See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 399 (“[W]hatever one thinks of the [Visual Artists 
Rights Act], it is doubtful that it complies with our obligations under Berne.”). 
37 Id. at 389 (“Although American Copyright law has never adopted an integrated 
version of the moral right, the concept has made its way incrementally into the law in 
three ways.  First, an author’s integrity and arbitration rights have been protected 
piecemeal by various bodies of state and federal law.  Second, about a dozen states have 
passed statutes explicitly recognizing the moral rights of visual artists.  Third, in the 
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, federal law has followed the lead of state law by 
protecting the integrity and attribution rights of visual artists.”). 
38 See generally Lipton, supra note 3 (drawing substantively on the work of Professor 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall and Professor Neil Netanel in considering the possibility of 
developing moral rights legislation for the United States). 
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protecting authors’ rights in their original creations in the United 
States.39 
While the law in many European Union countries contemplates 
the existence of a wide variety of moral rights,40 only two rights 
are required to be enacted into domestic law by signatories to the 
Berne Convention.  They are the right of attribution (or paternity) 
and the right of integrity.41  The former relates to the creator’s right 
to claim authorship of the work, while the latter relates to the 
author’s right to “object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to” the 
work.42  The Berne Convention also provides that any such 
distortion or mutilation must be “prejudicial to the [author’s] honor 
or reputation.”43  However, there is little guidance as to what 
would be considered prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation 
in this context. 
The right of attribution is closely related to plagiarism in the 
sense that each of these wrongs involves either failing to attribute a 
source or falsely attributing a source.  Obviously, in countries 
where the right of attribution is available as a cause of action, 
authors can pursue legal recourse in the courts.  In jurisdictions 
where such a right is not available to authors, however, such 
creators must rely on academic and market conceptions of 
plagiarism, or honor codes in academic and other settings where 
they might be enforced institutionally.  Where plagiarism is 
asserted in the commercial marketplace, market forces (such as 
consumer outcry) may give an easier and more effective remedy 
than legal action because a publisher may be pressured or shamed 
                                                                                                             
39 Id. at 580 (concluding that even if the United States adopted a broader conception of 
moral rights, such laws would be unlikely to assist many contemporary fiction authors 
address the kinds of unauthorized borrowing with which they have expressed concerns in 
recent years in the digital context). 
40 Id. at 544 (including the right to refuse to create, the right to create and publish in 
any form desired, the right to withdraw or destroy a work, the prohibition against 
excessive criticism, and the prohibition against other injuries to the creator’s personality). 
41 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis(1), 
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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into withdrawing a plagiarized work from sale relatively 
promptly.44 
Where a failure to properly attribute work occurs in the context 
of unauthorized copying, as is often the case, a copyright action 
may also be available.  For example, in a highly publicized case 
several years ago, popular author Dan Brown was accused of 
copyright infringement with respect to material in his bestseller 
The Da Vinci Code, which had allegedly been borrowed without 
attribution from a previous work.45 
The right of integrity is in many ways the moral rights 
correspondent to the derivative works right in Copyright law.  Both 
have to do with altering an original work.  However, the central 
thrust and underlying doctrine of the two actions is different.  The 
derivative works right is based on protecting the right to control 
economic markets for a work and is the exclusive right of the 
copyright holder, whether or not that entity is the author of the 
work.46  In the case of many commercial literary works—as well as 
academic texts—the copyright holder is the publisher, rather than 
the author. 
In contrast, the moral right of integrity is essentially a right of 
the author, regardless of whether the author has assigned the 
copyright to another entity.47  It is a right personal to the author to 
prevent mutilations of a work, or representations of the work that 
do not meet with the author’s approval.48  In this sense, the right of 
integrity can actually interfere with a copyright holder’s ability to 
commercially exploit the work.49  If the author objects to the 
                                                                                                             
44 See infra Part I.D. 
45 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 13 (“[D]an Brown, the author of The Da Vinci Code, 
who was sued for copyright infringement by the authors of an earlier book on the grounds 
that he’d stolen their idea of Jesus Christ having married Mary Magdalene and fathered 
children by her, won the suit.”). 
46 See 4 PATRY, supra note 30, § 12:1 (explanation of rights in derivative works). 
47 See id. § 23:23 (explaining moral rights of integrity and attribution, and their 
waivability as a matter of international Copyright law). 
48 See id. 
49 See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 400 (“Moral rights protection will inherently clash 
with the way many works are created in cultural and entertainment industries such as 
moviemaking, publishing, and broadcasting.  These intensely collaborative endeavors are 
exploited through subsidiary markets.  For example, motion pictures are abridged for 
television, textbooks are revised and translated, and music is synchronized, adapted, and 
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copyright holder’s plans for use of the work and the right of 
integrity is implicated, the author can—absent a contractual 
provision preventing such a course of action—bring an action to 
prevent the publisher’s activities. 
For example, if a copyright holder wanted to authorize a ghost 
writer to write a sequel or a prequel to an existing work and the 
original author objected to the new work on moral rights grounds, 
that author may have an action available to prevent the new work 
in a country where the right was available and where it had not 
been modified or excluded by contract.  In most cases, the rights 
are modified or excluded by contract in these kinds of situations 
although some countries’ laws do not allow for waiver of a moral 
right by an original creator.50 
Even though it appears that moral rights could have a 
significant impact on downstream works like prequels, sequels and 
retellings or remixes of existing works, the reality is that moral 
rights protection tends to be weak in practice.  Authors often do 
not have the financial wherewithal or legal knowledge to exercise 
such rights in countries where they are available.  The rights are 
only available in limited jurisdictions, and even within those 
jurisdictions authors are often contractually required to waive the 
rights when they contract with commercial publishers. 
D. Plagiarism 
 
Plagiarism is attracting increasing attention, though 
whether this is because it is becoming more 
                                                                                                             
broadcast in a multiplicity of forms.  These lucrative derivative markets, which attract 
significant investment into the entertainment and cultural industries, are regulated by 
contractual agreement.  But an expansive moral rights concept, presenting a constant 
threat of legal challenge brought about by any one or more collaborators, would tend to 
undermine the economic expectations and the delicate allocation of rights achieved 
through private negotiation between authors, users, and labor unions.  The result may be 
less financial support for such collaborate artistic endeavors, ultimately harming the 
public interest.”). 
50 See, e.g., Mrinalini Kochupillai, Moral Rights Under Copyright Laws: A Peep into 
Policy—Part 1, SPICY IP BLOG (Dec. 4, 2007), http://spicyip.com/2007/12/moral-rights-
under-copyright-laws-peep.html (discussing the waivability of moral rights under Indian 
intellectual property statutes and comparing this issue with legislation in other 
jurisdictions). 
2014] A TAXONOMY OF BORROWING 967 
common, or because its boundaries are becoming 
vague and contested, or because it is being detected 
more often (digitization has made it at once easier 
to commit and easier to detect) are among the many 
questions about it that call for investigation.51 
 
While not giving rise to a legal action, plagiarism is garnering 
much attention in the digital world.  This may be because, as Judge 
Posner posits, plagiarism is both easier to commit and easier to 
detect since the advent of digital technologies.52  It may also be 
because more and more people are creating literary and artistic 
works online and creation often involves borrowing which is, in 
many instances, uncredited.  Thus, the incidence of plagiarism in 
society overall is likely increasing exponentially. 
A brief survey of attitudes to unauthorized digital borrowing 
suggests that those involved in creative remixing activities online 
often confuse copyright infringement and plagiarism.53  This may 
also explain the increased focus on the concept of plagiarism in the 
digital world.  Even successful professional authors often conflate 
copyright infringement with plagiarism.  Recall, for example, 
Maggie Stiefvater’s comments equating a derivative work with 
plagiarism.54 
Because plagiarism is not, strictly speaking, a legal wrong, 
there is no statutory definition of the term.  It appears in a number 
of institutional honor codes, and is clearly a matter of concern in 
the commercial publishing world.55  However, its contours are 
vague.56  In describing the concept, Judge Posner notes that while 
typical dictionary definitions contemplate that plagiarism is akin to 
“literary theft,”57 this description is incomplete in several respects, 
including: (a) it is possible to plagiarize works other than literary 
                                                                                                             
51 POSNER, supra note 6, at 9. 
52 Id. 
53 See Jacqueline Lipton, Copyright, Plagiarism, and Emerging Norms in Digital 
Publishing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2014). 
54 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
55 See infra Part II.C. 
56 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 11 (“‘[P]lagiarism’ turns out to be difficult to define.”). 
57 Id. 
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works;58 (b) plagiarism can occur without theft because “stealing” 
a work does not deprive the author or her readers of the work;59 
but, (c) plagiarism is more than borrowing because the “borrowed” 
matter is not returned.60 
Posner acknowledges that an important aspect of plagiarism, at 
least with respect to literary works, is that it tends to occur in cases 
where the plagiarist copies either expression or ideas without 
acknowledgment of the original source “so that readers of the new 
work are invited to think that [the copied] features are the 
invention or discovery of the plagiarist.”61  Plagiarism thus differs 
from copyright in the sense that it involves either expression or 
ideas, or both.  In other words, plagiarism extends to non-
copyrightable features of a work such as the underlying ideas when 
they are presented in a new work without attribution as to source. 
Posner’s conception of plagiarism, and indeed that which is 
embodied in many honor codes, invokes the concept of fraud on 
the reader—the idea that the reader is being misled as to the 
provenance of particular expressions or ideas.62  Thus, he suggests 
that plagiarism does not necessarily occur in contexts where there 
is no acknowledgment of the original source, but the readers of the 
new work are “indifferent.”63  In other words, “they may be 
deceived, but the deception has no consequences.”64  He gives the 
example of textbook authors.  Many textbooks, notably high 
school texts, do not cite all their sources because “there is no 
pretense of originality—rather the contrary: the most reliable 
textbook is one that confines itself to ideas already well accepted 
by experts in the field.”65 
Posner also suggests that plagiarism rightfully involves a 
“reliance” interest in the sense that the plagiarist’s activities, along 
                                                                                                             
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 11–12. 
61 Id. at 14. 
62 Id. at 19 (describing plagiarism as conduct that is “deceitful in the sense of 
misleading the intended readers”). 
63 Id. at 18. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 18–19 (noting that “since students have little or no interest in the origins of the 
ideas they are studying, source references would merely clutter the exposition”). 
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with being deceitful as to source, induce some kind of reliance in a 
consumer, such as purchasing a book she would not otherwise 
have purchased if she knew it was really the work of another 
writer.66  He suggests that: 
The reader has to care about being deceived about 
authorial identity in order for the deceit to cross the 
line to fraud and thus constitute plagiarism.  More 
precisely, he has to care enough that had he known 
he would have acted differently.  There are 
innumerable intellectual deceits that do little or no 
harm because they engender little or no reliance.  
They arouse not even tepid moral indignation, and 
so they escape the plagiarism label.67 
He gives the example of judges who sign opinions that are 
actually written predominantly or completely by their law clerks 
without attribution.68  Generally, this conduct is not regarded as 
plagiarism.  Likewise, Posner suggests that celebrities and 
politicians who employ the services of ghost writers for their 
memoirs are not engaging in plagiarism as the public does not 
expect the celebrities to be the “real” authors, but merely expects 
them to endorse the contents of the books.69 
These situations may be contrasted with some of the conduct 
considered in Part II that involves remixing fictional works by 
cutting and pasting passages from existing texts into a new text and 
changing character names before selling the work as a completely 
new work without attribution of the original sources.  This may 
amount to copyright infringement, but it would also likely satisfy 
Posner’s definition of plagiarism because it is deceitful in its 
failure to provide attribution.  At the same time, the plagiarist 
intends that the consumer rely on the deceit and buy her book 
rather than, or alongside, the original works.  The plagiarist seeks 
to have the consumer act differently in reliance on her deceit by 
purchasing a book she would not otherwise have purchased had 
she known the truth. 
                                                                                                             
66 Id. at 19–20. 
67 Id. at  20. 
68 Id. at 20–21. 
69 Id. at 24–26. 
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While most participants in online publishing communities 
probably do not think through the concept of plagiarism in as much 
detail as Judge Posner, his insights are instructive as to the 
essential differences between plagiarism and copyright 
infringement.  Plagiarism is not unimportant in digital publishing 
marketplaces simply because it does not ground a legal cause of 
action.  In fact, some claims of plagiarism can have a more 
immediate and greater impact in redressing a perceived wrong than 
a copyright claim.  Claims of plagiarism may cause the market to 
respond quickly and often decisively, while claims of copyright 
infringement may take significant time and expense to work their 
way through the courts before an outcome is reached.  Even if the 
case ultimately settles, the focus on the legal cause of action can 
lead parties to wait to see how the judicial winds are blowing 
before engaging in attempts to negotiate a settlement. 
II. TAXONOMY OF DIGITAL BORROWING 
A. Anecdotal Evidence of Online Borrowing 
One thing missing from much of the previous discussion of 
Copyright law, plagiarism, and moral rights law (in jurisdictions 
where moral rights apply to literary endeavors) is an unpacking of 
the different categories of borrowing with which authors and 
copyright holders may be concerned in the digital age.  In a 
previous Article, the author proposed a new “taxonomy” of 
borrowing drawn from practices currently occurring in the world 
of digital publishing.70  This discussion extends the taxonomy and 
examines in more detail the appropriate regulatory approaches to 
each category of borrowing with a view to determining whether a 
more nuanced approach to unauthorized digital borrowing may be 
developed in the future.  The taxonomy is drawn from anecdotal 
evidence of conduct currently taking place in the digital publishing 
world. 
From a survey of online blogs and email discussions with 
writers and publishers, the author has ascertained that there are at 
least five different classes of unauthorized (but not necessarily 
                                                                                                             
70 See Lipton, supra note 53. 
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“wrongful”) online borrowing about which writers and copyright 
holders may express concerns.  It is important to note that these 
categories are based on practical usages of works in the digital 
publishing industry rather than on legal distinctions.  Thus, the 
applications of regulatory principles to the categories will overlap 
while the categories themselves may be practically distinct with 
respect to the concerns they raise for authors and copyright 
holders. 
The categories comprise: 
(a) Direct literal copying of an entire text which 
basically equates to traditional “piracy.”  The 
resulting works are likely perfect or near-perfect 
market substitutes for the original works. 
(b) Direct literal copying of an entire text for 
functionally transformative purposes in 
circumstances where the copies do not displace the 
original works in the market. 
(c) Copying of snippets of text usually from 
multiple sources in the process of creating a new 
work. 
(d) Creating a derivative work based on the 
characters, settings, or plot points of an existing 
work without literally copying text, and with the 
intention of commercially profiting from the new 
work. 
(e) Creating a derivative work—as in (d) above—
with no intention to commercially profit from the 
new.  This category largely refers to the creation of 
fanfiction. 
These classes of conduct obviously overlap to a significant 
extent, particularly in terms of the legal analysis that might be 
applied, although the results of the legal analysis may differ from 
class to class.  Categories (d) and (e) are arguably two sides of the 
same coin—commercial versus noncommercial derivative works.  
They have been separated for the purposes of this discussion 
because of the notable online norms that have developed in relation 
to noncommercial fanfiction as opposed to, say, the writing of 
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unauthorized commercially-viable prequels or sequels to an 
existing work.71 
The distinction between the two classes of conduct may be 
illustrated by comparing the copyright litigation and large sums of 
money involved in the dispute over whether Alice Randall’s 
retelling of Gone with the Wind (entitled The Wind Done Gone) 
amounted to copyright infringement72 with the voluminous amount 
of non-contentious Gone with the Wind fanfiction freely available 
online.73  It should be noted here that the actual Gone with the 
Wind litigation was framed in terms of an infringement of the 
reproduction right, rather than the derivative works right.  
However, the court focused on the notion of markets for derivative 
works in its analysis of the fourth fair use factor—examining the 
extent to which the defendant’s work might encroach into markets 
that the original copyright holder may want to reserve for 
authorized sequels and retellings of the original story.74 
Categories (a) and (c) in the taxonomy may also be difficult to 
distinguish in practice as both involve direct and literal copying 
from an existing original work.  Thus, each sounds like a per se 
copyright infringement.  While both classes of conduct likely do 
amount to copyright infringement depending on the 
circumstances—and in category (c), for example, the amount of 
the original work taken by the copyist—they raise different 
concerns in different contexts.  Though there is little doubt that a 
direct literal copy of an entire text, particularly when distributed 
online, is problematic for the copyright holder as it is a perfect 
market substitute for the original work, there may be more doubt 
with regard to the borrowing of snippets to create a new work.  
One might argue that a new work constructed from snippets of 
multiple existing works actually does contribute something new to 
the marketplace of ideas and might be protected as a 
transformative use under the fair use doctrine.  However, there will 
be cases where the remixing of existing works to create a new 
                                                                                                             
71 See id. 
72 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
73 See, e.g., Archive of Gone with the Wind, FANFICTION, https://www.fanfiction.
net/book/Gone-with-the-Wind (last visited June 13, 2014). 
74 See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1274–76. 
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work will be very similar to traditional piracy,75 particularly if 
intended to substitute for, or potentially detract sales from the 
original works. 
Of course, as noted above,76 sometimes direct literal copying of 
an entire work will be excused by the fair use doctrine in 
circumstances where the resulting copy is not a market substitute 
for the original work.  The search engine cases are obvious 
examples of this,77 and this is the purpose of category (b).  This 
category differentiates full text literal copying that threatens the 
market for the original work with full text literal copying that does 
not create such a threat because of the lack of actual or potential 
market displacement.  While the copyist’s purposes in category (b) 
cases may be commercial, the products of the copying do not 
threaten actual or potential markets for the original work.78 
The most effective way to demonstrate the contribution a 
taxonomy of borrowing might make to the development of legal 
and market regulations is to provide concrete examples of each 
different class of conduct.  Such examples evidence the different 
dynamics that arise between original creators, copyright holders, 
and copyists in different situations, and support the author’s 
contention that the taxonomy might give rise to a more nuanced 
approach to the regulation of unauthorized digital borrowing. 
B. Verbatim Copying of Entire Text 
Categories (a) and (b) in the proposed taxonomy each deal with 
verbatim copying of an entire text.  The categories might therefore 
be condensed into one single category.  However, this may be 
doing a disservice to ways in which Copyright law, in particular, 
has developed in recent years in light of the recognition of the 
“functional transformativeness” test that has crept into the factor 
one analysis of the fair use doctrine.  While verbatim copying of an 
entire text could never amount to a derivative work—because it 
involves copying the actual text, not deriving something new from 
                                                                                                             
75 See infra Part II.C. 
76 See supra Part I.B.2. 
77 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 24–26. 
78 See Authors Guild v. Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 292–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(“Google does not sell its scans, and the scans do not replace the books.”). 
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it—it may nevertheless allow consumers to see the work in a new 
way or in a new context. 
The purpose of the distinction between categories (a) and (b) is 
to differentiate what might be regarded as good old-fashioned 
piracy (category (a)) from more socially beneficial uses of a work 
(category (b)).  Little need be said about category (a).  The law 
would typically deal with it as a copyright infringement both in 
terms of the actual copying of the original work and in terms of 
any subsequent dissemination of the work.  The resulting copies 
would likely, or potentially, serve as market substitutes for the 
original, particularly in the age of near-perfect digital copies of a 
text file. 
On the other hand, category (b) conduct—while involving 
verbatim copies of entire works—does not create market 
substitutes for these works.  Category (b) contemplates activities 
such as the Google book project and the Hathitrust digitization 
project for library materials.79  While digitization in the search 
engine or library context does involve verbatim copying of entire 
works, there is no (or very little) market substitution effect.  In 
fact, the activities of the copyists may assist consumers to locate 
and utilize legally disseminated copies of the original works in new 
and socially beneficial ways.  The aim of the copying is to assist 
individuals to locate and use original works more easily and 
effectively.  This conduct has been regarded by courts as excused 
under Copyright law by the application of the fair use doctrine.  In 
the Google books situation, for example, the court made much of 
the first fair use factor to hold that Google’s digitization of the 
plaintiff’s members’ books is transformative in the sense that it 
promotes research and expands public access to books.80 
While this result under Copyright law is laudable, the problem 
for future developments involving digitized literary texts is that it 
                                                                                                             
79 See Authors Guild Inc. v. Hathitrust, No. 11 CV 6351 HB, 2013 WL 603193 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013). 
80 Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (“Google’s use of the copyrighted works is highly 
transformative.  Google Books digitizes books and transforms expressive text into a 
comprehensive word index that helps readers, scholars, researchers, and others find 
books.  Google Books has become an important tool for libraries and librarians as cite-
checkers as it helps to identify and find books.  The use of book text to facilitate search 
through the display of snippets is transformative.”). 
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relies on a court’s finding that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
work is a fair use.  Such a finding can only be made after the fact 
in the context of copyright litigation.  There is no ex ante guidance 
available as to whether a particular verbatim coy is fair use in any 
given context.  Even the Google books litigation took years to 
make its way through the courts and cost the parties plenty of 
money and time.81  The litigation raised by the Association of 
American Publishers against Google ultimately settled, thus 
providing no explicit legal precedent as to the kinds of uses Google 
was making of the literary texts in question.82  It was not until the 
action raised by the Authors Guild against Google was decided in 
2013 that any legal precedent was forthcoming.83 
One of the aims of proposing the taxonomy advocated in this 
Article is to focus on the classes of conduct that have recently 
taken place in the digital world in an attempt to propose more ex 
ante guidance as to conduct that should be deemed acceptable.  
While it is difficult to formulate a legal rule that would 
differentiate acceptable versus unacceptable instances of verbatim 
copying of an entire work, some ex ante guidance may be gleaned 
from drawing the line between market substitution cases and cases 
of copying that are more socially beneficial. 
Interestingly, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, 
commercial motivations per se become extremely important in the 
context of categories (c), (d) and (e) of the taxonomy, while they 
are arguably less important in distinguishing between category (a) 
and (b).  Where verbatim copying of an entire work is for a 
noncommercial purpose, the resultant copies can still serve as 
market substitutes for an original work under category (a) and thus 
be considered wrongful.  Even if the copying is undertaken for 
commercial benefit, it can nevertheless be socially beneficial or 
functionally transformative under category (b), and thus be 
excusable.  Thus, while commercial motives may be a key factor in 
                                                                                                             
81 The lawsuit commenced in 2005. See Elinor Mills, Authors Guild Sues Google Over 
Library Project, CNET NEWS (Sept. 21, 2005), http://news.cnet.com/Authors-Guild-sues-
Google-over-library-project/2100-1030_3-5875384.html.  
82 See Claire Cain Miller, Google Deal Gives Publishers a Choice: Digitize or Not, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/technology/google-and-
publishers-settle-over-digital-books.html?_r=0. 
83 See generally Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282. 
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other areas of the taxonomy to distinguish good conduct from bad, 
they are perhaps less decisive and should be given less weight in 
cases of verbatim copying of entire works.  The key to these cases 
appears to be market substitution (or lack thereof) as well as the 
potential for transformative functionality of the work. 
C. Literal Copying of Snippets 
 
I love Easy by Tammara Webber and so do 
hundreds of thousands of other readers.  
Unfortunately, one Jordan Williams recognized this 
and thought, hmmm, I’ll just incorporate whole 
swaths of text from Webber’s famous and much 
beloved book.  Worse, Jordan William’s book is 
selling like mad.  It’s 58 in the US Kindle store, as 
of this writing.84 
 
It is possible that describing category (c) of the taxonomy as 
borrowing of “snippets” is a misnomer in that it creates an 
impression of minimal taking from another’s work.  In fact, 
borrowing of multiple snippets, often from various different 
sources, to create a new work can be—and has, in the past, been—
highly problematic for the creators of original works and 
consumers alike.  Because of the inherent consumer deception in 
taking snippets from pre-existing works and repackaging them as a 
new work, this conduct tends to be described as plagiarism, 
although in many cases it also amounts to copyright infringement.  
Taking snippets from existing works and repurposing them in a 
new work can obviously infringe the reproduction, public 
dissemination, and derivative works rights that are exclusively 
reserved to the author under § 106 of the Copyright Act.85 
One very high-profile example of this class of conduct in the 
“bricks and mortar” publishing world occurred in 2006 when then-
                                                                                                             
84 Jane Litte, The Plagiarizing of Tammara Webber’s Easy by @JordinBWilliams, 
DEAR AUTHOR BLOG (June 26, 2013), http://dearauthor.com/book-reviews/the-
plagiarizing-of-tammara-webbers-easy-by-jordin-williams. 
85 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the exclusive rights of copyright owners in their 
works). 
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Harvard student Kaavya Viswanathan published a book entitled 
How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild, and Got a Life.86  It was 
published by major publishing house under a two-book deal.87  
Viswanathan was given an advance of $500,000, and sold the 
movie rights to Dreamworks.88  The book was later withdrawn 
from the shelves after claims were made that Viswanathan had 
copied passages verbatim from existing authors including Meg 
Cabot, Megan McCafferty, and Salman Rushdie.89  Her publishing 
contract was cancelled and existing copies of the book were 
recalled and destroyed.90 
This situation is a good example of the way in which an 
assertion of plagiarism may be a more powerful incentive for a 
publisher to act than a threat of copyright infringement.  Where 
plagiarism is asserted, there is the implication that the publisher 
has been involved in something “dishonorable,” thereby interfering 
with its credibility in the market.  Copyright, on the other hand, 
may be regarded more as a legal matter, rather than a matter of 
honor.  Where a copyright infringement claim is made against an 
author or publisher, the participants in the action may leave the 
matter to their lawyers and the courts, rather than be concerned 
about their reputation or honor in the field.  As copyright is a strict-
liability wrong,91 it arguably does not carry the same dishonorable 
connotations as an allegation of plagiarism. 
In many ways, the Viswanathan case is an easy example 
because the author as well as the publisher obviously acted with 
commercial motivations.  Clearly, given the size of the advance 
paid to the author, the publisher had high commercial hopes for the 
book and was obviously the subject of major embarrassment when 
the claims of plagiarism were publicly made.92  Other cases may 
not be so simple.  For example, cases where a self-published 
                                                                                                             
86 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 3. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id.; see also How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild, and Got a Life, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/How_Opal_Mehta_Got_Kissed,_Got_Wild,_and_Got_a_Lif
e  (last visited June 13, 2014). 
90 See POSNER, supra note 6, at 3. 
91 See LEAFFER, supra note 2, at 539. 
92 Embarrassment is inferred here from the fact that the book was removed from sale. 
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author borrows smaller snippets from less well known works.  
Such conduct is not necessarily any less “wrongful” than 
Viswanathan’s activities.  However, it may not be as high profile 
and a self-published author may be less equipped to act to remedy 
the situation than a major publishing house. 
Of course, even a self-published author may rely on a digital 
distributor such as Amazon, Barnes and Noble, or Kobo to 
disseminate her works.  Thus, in the digital world, the service 
providers that enable self-publishing may take on the role of 
monitoring unauthorized borrowing that was previously the task of 
traditional publishers.93  There is some anecdotal evidence that the 
self-publishing author community and its readers rely on 
companies like Amazon to take on such a role, raising concerns 
about the extent to which these service providers are sufficiently 
active in detecting and preventing plagiarism and copyright 
infringement, or at least responding to allegations of such 
conduct.94 
For example, in 2013 a similar situation arose in the digital 
self-publishing world as the 2006 “real world” example of 
Viswanathan’s book.  A self-published romance author working 
under the pseudonym “Jordin Williams” released a book that 
included large snippets taken verbatim from two previous self-
published bestsellers: Easy by Tammara Webber, and Beautiful 
Disaster by Jamie McGuire.95  The two latter books were 
ultimately picked up by commercial publishers and marketed 
through traditional channels.96 
As soon as the online community detected the copying an 
outcry arose in the blogosphere.97  A grassroots campaign ensued 
advocating that those who purchased Williams’ book demand 
refunds from Amazon and that the book be withdrawn from sale.98  
The campaign resulted in the refunds being made and the book 
                                                                                                             
93 See Lipton, supra note 53. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 JAMIE MCGUIRE, BEAUTIFUL DISASTER (2012); TAMMARA WEBBER, EASY (2012). 
97 See Lipton, supra note 53. 
98 See id. 
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being withdrawn by the distributor, Amazon.99  The online 
discussions evidenced confusion about whether the concern was 
truly copyright infringement or plagiarism, but the bottom line was 
that most agreed that taking another’s work for commercial gain 
without attribution was wrongful.100  Thus, even though the players 
and dynamics were a little different in the online situation to the 
Viswanathan situation, the results were similar.  The digital book 
was ultimately removed from sale and purchase prices were 
refunded to consumers, as they had acted in reliance on the 
deception that this was an original work by Williams. 
Category (c) conduct obviously differs from category (a) 
conduct in that the resulting copy here is not a perfect market 
substitute for the original work.  It is rather a remix of several 
original works that may or may not appeal to those who would 
otherwise have purchased the original works.  Category (c) also 
differs from categories (a) and (b) in that commercial motivations 
seem to be more significant in category (c) than in the previous 
categories.  Authors and consumers expressed concern that a 
copyist should not be allowed to profit commercially from stealing 
snippets of others’ work and repurposing them.101 
In contrast, we saw in comparing categories (a) and (b) that 
commercial motives were less significant.  Noncommercial copies 
of entire works could be perfect market substitutes for originals 
and thus wrongful, while commercial copies of entire works could 
be socially beneficial—as in the search engine context—and thus 
not wrongful even if done for commercial purposes.  Another 
important distinction between category (c) conduct and the 
previous categories in the taxonomy is that category (c) conduct 
tends by default to include lack of attribution to the borrowed 
works.  Thus, it is more likely to amount to plagiarism—and to an 
infringement of the moral right of attribution in jurisdictions where 
such a right is available to authors of literary works. 
D. Derivative Works 
 
                                                                                                             
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
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“It’s not illegal.”  All the arguments came easily to 
Cath; they were the justification for all fanfiction.  
“I don’t own the characters, but I’m not trying to 
sell them, either.”102 
 
As noted previously, the statutory definition of “derivative 
work” refers to: “[A] work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”103  In the 
context of literary works, derivative works tend to be prequels, 
sequels, and retellings of a story from another perspective.  Alice 
Randall’s The Wind Done Gone,104 for example, retells aspects of 
Margaret Mitchell’s classic Gone with the Wind105 from a new 
perspective.  When Mitchell’s estate brought a copyright 
infringement action against Randall, it was interestingly under the 
reproduction right rather than the derivative works right.106  Thus, 
the court struggled with applying the “substantial similarity” 
doctrine to a work that did not literally reproduce verbatim text 
from the original.107  Randall’s work could more easily have been 
characterized as a “derivative work” which might have made the 
infringement analysis somewhat easier. 
Generally, unauthorized derivative works may raise the specter 
of all three of the regulatory regimes applying to unauthorized 
borrowing discussed in Part I: copyright infringement; moral rights 
infringement (where available for literary works); and plagiarism.  
Under American copyright legislation, the right to create derivative 
works is an exclusive right of the copyright holder.108  In 
jurisdictions in which moral rights are available to authors of 
literary works, a derivative work may infringe the right of integrity 
                                                                                                             
102 RAINBOW ROWELL, FANGIRL 107–08 (2013). 
103 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
104 ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2002). 
105 MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936). 
106 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2001). 
107 See id. at 1266–68 (discussing copyrightability of characters and scenes in the 
absence of verbatim copying). 
108 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
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(where the author is attributed, but the story is retold in an 
unacceptable manner).109  If the copyist does not attribute the 
original author, the right of attribution may be implicated,110 
although derivative works generally are associated with the 
original work, unlike category (c) conduct where the source works 
may well be concealed. 
Plagiarism is a more complicated issue with respect to 
derivative works than with respect to category (c) conduct.  As 
derivative works usually expressly or implicitly identify the 
underlying source work, plagiarism in the sense of deceit against 
the consumer is unlikely to be an issue.  Plagiarism tends to give 
the impression that the copyist’s work is original to the copyist.  
Derivative works inherently bring the original work to the reader’s 
mind. 
The key distinction between categories (d) and (e) in the above 
taxonomy in many ways relates to the commercial motivation—or 
lack thereof—behind the creation of a particular derivative work.  
Where the work is intended to be commercialized, and thus may 
impinge on the copyright holder’s control of markets expressly 
reserved to it in the Copyright Act, the conduct is more likely to be 
problematic than when the work is noncommercial.  In the 
commercially-focused cases, the next factor to focus on (after 
commercial motive) will likely be transformativeness of the kind 
traditionally associated with the first fair use factor in copyright 
law: transformative of the substance of the work to provide new 
meanings or insights.  If the new work is commercially motivated, 
the next question will be whether it is a sufficiently new 
contribution to literature in this sense. 
Of course, if the copyright holder does not object to 
commercialization of a derivative work, no litigation will ensue 
and the courts will not have cause to consider any of these issues.  
Recent examples are the best-selling Fifty Shades of Grey 
trilogy,111 and the popular Gabriel’s Inferno trilogy,112 both of 
                                                                                                             
109 See 7 PATRY, supra note 30, §23:23. 
110 See id. 
111 E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES OF GREY (2012); E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES DARKER 
(2012); E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES FREED (2012). 
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which were originally based on noncommercial Twilight 
fanfiction.113  In neither case did the copyright holders raise 
concerns about copyright infringement.  If they had, much would 
have turned on the legal analysis of the traditional 
transformativeness test applied under the first fair use factor. 
These exceptions aside, noncommercial derivative works in the 
literary sphere tend to arise in the context of fanfiction authors who 
do not attempt to commercialize their work.  These derivative 
works are typically noncommercial retellings of existing works 
engaged in by members of the work’s fandom.114  The rise of 
Internet communications led to an explosion of fanfiction 
communities.115 
A recent (traditionally published) young adult romance novel, 
Fangirl by Rainbow Rowell, actually revolves around a 
protagonist—Cath—who is a noted fanfiction author and who has 
trouble, when she enrolls in a fiction-writing class at college, 
creating her own characters and situations.116  At one point in the 
narrative, Cath explains to her bemused fiction writing professor 
her comfort level with writing fanfiction as opposed to her own 
original work: 
[“]But I don’t want to write my own fiction,” Cath 
said, as emphatically as she could. “I don’t want to 
write my own characters or my own worlds—I 
don’t care about them.” She clenched her fists in her 
lap. “I care about Simon Snow.  And I know he’s 
not mine, but that doesn’t matter to me.  I’d rather 
pour myself into a world I love and understand than 
try to make something up out of nothing.[”]117 
                                                                                                             
112 SYLVAIN REYNARD, GABRIEL’S INFERNO (2012); SYLVAIN REYNARD, GABRIEL’S 
RAPTURE (2012); SYLVAIN REYNARD, GABRIEL’S REDEMPTION (2013). 
113 See Tushnet, supra note 27 (discussing the derivation of “Masters of the 
Universe”—precursor story to the Gabriel’s Inferno trilogy—and “Fifty Shades of Grey” 
from Twilight fanfiction). 
114 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
115 See Tushnet, supra note 17, 651–52 (noting the broad accessibility of user-generated 
fanfiction content since the advent of the Internet). 
116 ROWELL, supra note 102. 
117 Id. 
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During the story, Cath comes to terms with the place of 
fanfiction in her development as a creative artist and learns the 
difference between, and importance of, being able to create her 
own original characters and stories if she seeks a career as a 
legitimate fiction writer.118  Cath’s story mirrors the true-life 
stories of many modern-day authors who initially cut their teeth on 
fanfiction before graduating to original fiction.  Some examples are 
Meg Cabot, author of the bestselling Princess Diaries series, 
Cassandra Clare, author of the popular Mortal Instruments series, 
and best-selling fantasy author Naomi Novik.119  Of course, E.L. 
James and Sylvain Reynard, authors of the Fifty Shades and 
Gabriel’s Inferno books are also obviously examples of authors 
who transformed a fanfiction interest into a professional writing 
career even though their works might technically be derivative 
works encroaching on markets arguably reserved to the original 
copyright holders under the copyright act.  In any event, the ability 
to write fanfiction is arguably an important aspect of the 
development of new creative artists and should be tolerated, or 
arguably encouraged. 
In jurisdictions where moral rights protection is available for 
authors of literary works, fanfiction may be more problematic, 
particularly in terms of the right of integrity.  Moral rights do not 
generally depend on commercializing a work in competition with 
the author, but rather with presenting a work in a light of which the 
author does not approve.  As noted above, the Berne Convention 
additionally contemplates that the new work must damage the 
author’s reputation in some way, although this concept is not 
defined in the Berne Convention.120  In the absence of specific 
moral rights protection for authors of literary works, the legal 
position on fanfiction in the United States is arguably easier to deal 
with than potentially in countries that have a strong moral rights 
jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                             
118 Id. 
119 See Alexander Alter, The Weird World of Fan Fiction, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230373420457746441182597 
0488. 
120 Berne Convention, supra note 41, art. 6bis(1). 
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While the law relating to fanfiction even in the United States is 
not well settled, the weight of opinion seems to be that fanfiction 
would qualify as a fair use under copyright law, provided that it is 
noncommercial.121  Existing authors differ in their personal 
attitudes to fan fiction.122  A number of established traditionally 
published authors have acknowledged that writing fanfiction is a 
useful way for aspiring authors to become comfortable with the 
process of writing, and many do not object to fanfiction based on 
their own work provided that it is noncommercial.123  Some 
authors—even those who were originally opposed to fanfiction—
now embrace these activities of fans as free advertising and 
expressions of the fans’ their affection for, and deep connection to, 
the underlying works.124 
However, other authors have publicly taken a stance against 
fan fiction.  Best-selling urban fantasy author Anne Rice has been 
an outspoken critic of fanfiction and states on her website that she 
does not “allow” fanfiction relating to her works.125  Interestingly, 
Anne Rice has licensed derivative works including movies and a 
Broadway musical based on her books.126  Thus, it may be that her 
real concern is with commercially-oriented derivative works and 
not fanfiction per se.  This is one reason for the distinction 
between commercially motivated derivative works and 
noncommercial derivative works in the above taxonomy.  It seems 
that the commercial motivation is a key to distinguishing works 
that are on balance considered socially acceptable from those that 
are not. 
                                                                                                             
121 See Alter, supra note 119 (“Most experts agree that fan fiction qualifies as fair use 
under Copyright law, provided that it differs substantially from the original and its 
creators don’t attempt to profit from it.”). 
122 See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Copyright’s Twilight Zone: Digital Copyright Lessons 
from the Vampire Blogosphere, 70 MD. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
123 See Alter, supra note 119. 
124 See id. 
125 See Lipton, supra note 3, at 551–53 (on Anne Rice’s stance on fanfiction). 
126 See Lestat (musical), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lestat_(musical) (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2014) (discussing the musical Lestat, based on Rice’s novel The Vampire 
Chronicles). 
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Compare noncommercial fanfiction with, say, Alice Randall’s 
commercially published retelling of Gone with the Wind,127 or the 
retelling of J.D. Salinger’s famous Catcher in the Rye by a 
Swedish author who attempted to commercially publish a sequel to 
the novel starring a geriatric version of the book’s iconic 
protagonist, Holden Caulfield.128  While Copyright law may 
encourage retellings of literary works for purely expressive 
noncommercial purposes, even where the retellings garner their 
own large audiences within the fandom, the line becomes more 
difficult to cross with respect to conduct that trespasses on markets 
reserved by Congress to copyright holders.  This approach is 
reflected in comments on the blogosphere by participants in the 
self-publishing community (writers and readers alike): 
 You want to fanfic in your world for free—
have at it.  But when you sell intellectual property 
to a consumer, I truly believe you should be the one 
intellectually creating it from beginning to end.129 
I think fanfiction and fandoms are great, but once 
you try to make a buck off of it you’ve crossed the 
line.130 
 I’m not opposed to fanfic authors 
transitioning into published ones.  I was there—it’s 
a great tool in the growth of an author.  But when 
you see that you can attract fans, and you decide 
you want to be paid for your talent, that’s when it’s 
time to let that other person’s world go and create 
your own.131 
 I think fanfiction definitely has a place, but 
it’s important for fanfic writers to still be original 
and not plagiarize, and it’s equally as important that 
                                                                                                             
127 As noted above, the case was not actually litigated under the derivative works right, 
but many would consider an unauthorized retelling of an existing work to be a derivative 
work. 
128 See BBC News, Sequel to Catcher in the Rye ‘Banned in US,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 
2011, 12:09 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-12181223.  The 
Salinger litigation was settled, with banning the sale of the book in the U.S. and Canada 
as a condition to the settlement.  
129 Stephanie Doyle, Comment No. 177 to Litte, supra note 84 (June 26, 2013). 
130 Ava Lore, Comment No. 185 to Litte, supra note 84 (June 26, 2013). 
131 Stephanie Doyle, Comment No. 192 to Litte, supra note 84 (June 26, 2013). 
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fanfiction doesn’t make money, because it’s not a 
wholly original creation.132 
Obviously, quoting comments from the blogosphere is not 
tantamount to engaging in a detailed statistical or doctrinal analysis 
as to how copyright law does, or should, work.  Nevertheless, if the 
underlying philosophy of Copyright law in the United States is to 
promote creativity,133 there is a strong argument for drawing a line 
between commercial and noncommercial derivative literary works 
in terms of what is permitted under the law.  Noncommercial 
works appear to encourage creativity within the fandom for an 
existing work while additionally serving as free advertising that 
draws attention to the original author’s work and may enhance 
sales.  Commercial work, on the other hand, while it may 
encourage creativity in the fandom, potentially detracts from the 
existing author’s market by encroaching on a market that is 
expressly reserved to the author in the Copyright Act. 
A counterargument would be that there should be room in the 
market for even commercially motivated derivative works and that 
even a commercially published derivative work will increase 
interest in the original work and provide free advertising for it.  It 
is possible, even likely, that readers of, say, Alice Randall’s The 
Wind Done Gone, who had never read Gone with the Wind, would 
purchase a copy of the original book out of a renewed interest in 
the story.134  The derivative work—even if commercially 
motivated—will focus more attention on the original work and 
may increase the market for the original work or revive the market 
for an original work. 
                                                                                                             
132 Kendra, Comment to Why I Have a Problem with Cassandra Clare & Why You 
Should Too, LIFE & WHAT-HAVE-YOU BLOG (Mar. 14, 2012, 11:49 AM), 
http://bellumina.wordpress.com/2012/03/14/049-why-i-have-a-problem-with-cassandra-
clare-why-you-should-too. 
133 See Tushnet, supra note 17, at 684 (“Copyright’s purpose . . . is to encourage 
creativity for the public interest, not only to ensure monopoly profits.”). 
134 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(Marcus, J., concurring) (“It is . . . possible that The Wind Done Gone will act as a 
complement to, rather than a substitute for, Gone with the Wind and its potential 
derivatives.  Readers of Randall’s book may want to refresh their recollections of the 
original.  It is not far-fetched to predict that sales of Gone with the Wind have grown 
since The Wind Done Gone’s publication.”). 
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Nevertheless, the commercial derivative work is more 
problematic for Copyright law than a noncommercial derivative 
work when applying the fair use doctrine.  While both commercial 
and noncommercial derivative works are prima facie infringements 
of the derivative works right in § 106 of the Copyright Act, the 
first fair use factor invites a court to consider the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial 
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.  As noted above,135 
courts applying this factor also consider the “transformativeness” 
of the defendant’s use in the sense of whether or not the use adds 
new insights to the existing works. 
While both commercial and noncommercial derivative literary 
works likely add new insights, noncommercial uses will be given 
greater deference as fair uses under the factor that requires courts 
to consider the commercial nature of the use.  Commercial uses 
will, if litigated, put more pressure on the first fair use factor in 
considering the concept of transformativeness of the content of the 
work.  This was a major consideration in the litigation involving 
Alice Randall’s derivative work based on Gone with the Wind.136  
While the case was litigated under the reproduction right rather 
than the derivative works right, the analysis of transformativeness 
is equally applicable to either claim. 
Transformativeness was also a significant criterion in an 
attempt to commercially publish the Harry Potter Lexicon, an 
unauthorized work based on a noncommercial website, that 
described the characters, places, artifacts, spells, potions and the 
like appearing in J.K. Rowling’s bestselling Harry Potter series.137  
J.K Rowling and Warner Bros., the producer of the Harry Potter 
                                                                                                             
135 See supra Part I.B.2. 
136 Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269 (“The fact that TWDG [The Wind Done Gone] was 
published for profit is the first factor weighing against a finding of fair use.  However, 
TWDG’s for-profit status is strongly overshadowed and outweighed in view of its highly 
transformative use of GWTW [Gone with the Wind]’s copyrighted elements.”). 
137 Warner Bros Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“The utility of the Lexicon, as a reference guide to a multi-volume work of fantasy 
literature, demonstrates a productive use for a different purpose than the original works.  
The Lexicon makes the elaborate imaginary world of Harry Potter searchable, item by 
item, and gives readers a complete picture of each item that cannot be gleaned by reading 
the voluminous series, since the material related to each item is scattered over thousands 
of pages of complex narrative and plot.”). 
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movies, sued the publishers of the Lexicon for copyright 
infringement.138  While the plaintiffs argued infringement of both 
the reproduction right and the derivative works right, interestingly 
the court held there was no infringement of the derivative works 
right.139  The plaintiffs succeeded only with respect to the 
reproduction right.140 
Nevertheless, the fair use analysis in the decision is instructive 
for the present discussion of commercialized derivative works.  
Ultimately, the court held that the defendant could not avail itself 
of the fair use doctrine, and, in so doing, focused much of the 
inquiry on the transformative nature of the defendant’s use, noting 
that the Lexicon was transformative, but not sufficiently and 
consistently transformative to support a fair use defense.141  The 
other fair use factors also weighed in the balance against the 
defendant, but the transformative use factor was discussed the most 
extensively because of the need under copyright law not to stifle 
creativity in relation even to pre-existing original works still 
protected by copyright.142 
                                                                                                             
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 538 (“A work is not derivative . . . simply because it is “based upon” the 
preexisting works.”); id. at 539 (“By condensing, synthesizing, and reorganizing the 
preexisting material in an A-to-Z reference guide, the Lexicon does not recast the 
material in another medium to retell the story of Harry Potter, but instead gives the 
copyrighted material another purpose.  That purpose is to give the reader a ready 
understanding of individual elements in the elaborate world of Harry Potter that appear in 
voluminous and diverse sources.  As a result, the Lexicon no longer ‘represents [the] 
original work[s] of authorship . . . .’  Under these circumstances, and because the Lexicon 
does not fall under any example of derivative works listed in the Statute, Plaintiffs have 
failed to show that the Lexicon is a derivative work.”). 
140 The court held that there was no infringement of the derivative works right by taking 
a relatively narrow interpretation of the § 101 definition of “derivative work” from the 
Copyright Act.  The court held that the Act “seeks to protect works that are ‘recast, 
transformed, or adapted’ into another medium, mode, language, or revised version, while 
still representing the ‘original work of authorship.’” Id. at 538.  Under this interpretation 
an unauthorized Lexicon, encyclopedia or guide to an existing work does not meet the 
statutory definition of “derivative work.” 
141 Id. at 540–46 (detailed analysis of the transformativeness of the Harry Potter 
Lexicon). 
142 Id. at 540 (“The ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the Copyright law’s goal of 
‘promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, ‘would 
be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.’”). 
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Factor four of the fair use test also invites courts to consider 
“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”143  While both commercial and noncommercial 
works may positively impact the market for the copyrighted work 
by drawing attention to the original work and serving as free 
advertising, a commercial work is more likely to be regarded as 
infringing on a market reserved to the copyright holder.144  This 
factor was also significant in the Harry Potter litigation.145  The 
Lexicon was ultimately published in a revised shorter form that 
apparently did not infringe copyright.146 
III. LESSONS FROM THE TAXONOMY 
A. Transformativeness 
Several issues emerge from the above discussion about the 
different classes of borrowing identified in the taxonomy.  As we 
might expect, copyright/fair use considerations involving the 
transformativeness of the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work 
and commercial use made by the defendant are central concerns of 
authors and copyright holders.  The ability to be attributed as the 
author of a given work is also important.  However, what is 
perhaps less obvious is that not all of these considerations arise 
                                                                                                             
143 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
144 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 545 (discussing the significance of commercial 
purpose to a finding for or against fair use in a copyright infringement suit). 
145 Id. at 550–51 (“[P]ublication of the Lexicon could harm sales of Rowling’s two 
companion books.  Unless they sought to enjoy the companion books for their 
entertainment value alone, consumers who purchased the Lexicon would have scant 
incentive to purchase either of Rowling’s companion books, as the information contained 
in these short works has been incorporated into the Lexicon almost wholesale.  Because 
the Lexicon’s use of the companion books is only marginally transformative, the Lexicon 
is likely to supplant the market for the companion books . . . .  Additionally, the fourth 
factor favors Plaintiffs if publication of the Lexicon would impair the market for 
derivative works that Rowling is entitled or likely to license.  Although there is no 
supporting testimony, one potential derivative market that would reasonably be 
developed or licensed by Plaintiffs is use of the songs and poems in the Harry Potter 
novels.  Because Plaintiffs would reasonably license the musical production or print 
publication of those songs and poems, Defendant unfairly harms this derivative market 
by reproducing verbatim the songs and poems without a license.”). 
146 See STEVE VANDER ARK, THE LEXICON: AN UNAUTHORIZED GUIDE TO HARRY 
POTTER FICTION AND RELATED MATERIALS (2009). 
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equally across the board in all cases of borrowing.  The taxonomy 
allows us to separate out classes of borrowing that raise 
predominantly commercial considerations from those that raise 
questions of attribution or social benefit.  While all of these 
concerns overlap to some extent, the taxonomy demonstrates that 
different issues are paramount in different kinds of borrowing 
situations. 
Starting with the issue of “transformativeness,” it appears that 
courts in the copyright context are in fact bifurcating this concept 
(in the context of the first fair use factor) into two distinct limbs.147  
The first is traditional transformativeness of the defendant’s use of 
the plaintiff’s work, which we typically see in the case of a 
derivative work.148  This is the type of transformativeness that 
involves the defendant adding new insights to the work itself.  In 
the case of the taxonomy, we typically see this type of 
transformativeness in categories (d) and (e) which involve creating 
unauthorized prequels, sequels, retellings, etc. of a given work.  
Interestingly, in these cases, creators of original works tend mainly 
to become concerned about transformativeness in cases where 
another person is attempting to commercialize a new version of the 
work.149  Once we are in the territory of commercialization, more 
pressure is put on the notion of traditional transformativeness (or 
transformation of content) under the first fair use factor if the case 
is litigated.150  Thus, there appears to be a clear relationship 
between commercialization and traditional transformativeness in 
the world of unauthorized reworkings of existing original literary 
texts. 
The second type of transformativeness that has arisen with 
respect to literary works is where the transformation refers to the 
function to which the work is put, rather than the content of the 
work.  These are the cases like the Google book-digitization 
project where the works are copied verbatim, and the 
                                                                                                             
147 See Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (“Courts have found a transformative 
purpose both where the defendant combines copyrighted expression with original 
expression to produce a new creative work . . . , and where the defendant uses a 
copyrighted work in a different context to serve a different function than the original.”). 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
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transformation arises in terms of enhanced searchability and easier 
access to the work by potential consumers.  Like the more 
traditional concept of transformativeness, this new concept is 
based on a policy of enhancing social benefit, but it operates 
differently in that it focuses on function rather than form of the 
copies.  In cases of transformative functionality, the creator of an 
original work may be less concerned about commercial purposes 
of the defendant and more concerned about potential market 
displacement.  Thus, there is perhaps a clear relationship between 
transformative functionality and market displacement, regardless 
of whether or not the defendant’s purposes revolve around making 
a commercial profit.  In other words, maybe notions of 
traditional/substantive transformativeness go hand in hand with 
concerns about unauthorized commercialization of the new work, 
while functional transformativeness is more clearly connected with 
market displacement questions. 
B. Unauthorized Commercialization 
Unauthorized commercial benefit is obviously a key concern of 
those involved in any creative endeavor and the publishing 
industry is no exception.  As we saw in Part II, in the context of 
fanfiction, one of the main concerns expressed by readers and 
authors is that a fanfiction author should not commercially benefit 
from characters and situations created by others if not authorized to 
do so.  Copyright law also heavily weighs in favor of preventing 
unauthorized commercial appropriations of the plaintiff’s work by 
the defendant.151  Two of the four fair use factors—factors one and 
four—take into account the defendant’s potential commercial 
purposes (factor one) and the damage the defendant may have done 
or may yet do to the plaintiff’s market (factor four).152  However, 
commercial motives on the copyist’s part are less relevant in cases 
of transformative functionality, such as the Google book 
digitization project, even where an entire work is copied verbatim. 
One contribution the taxonomy of borrowing makes is to assist 
in unpacking the concept of commercialization for copyright 
                                                                                                             
151 See id. at 545 (on significance of commercial use mitigating against fair use 
generally). 
152 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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purposes, and perhaps also to give a stronger sense of current 
market norms with respect to unauthorized borrowing.  Inherent in 
the taxonomy is the idea that commercialization is not a “one size 
fits all” concept, but contains degrees of seriousness.  Commercial 
motives on a defendant’s part may be acceptable provided that the 
defendant is engaging in activities that are significantly socially 
beneficial and do not create market substitutes for the original 
works, such as in the case of large-scale digital libraries.  This is 
the point of the distinction between categories (a) and (b) in the 
taxonomy.  The traditional commercial piracy cases involving 
market displacement of the original work are wrongful while cases 
where there is no such displacement are likely to be acceptable 
where there is a significant social benefit inherent in the verbatim 
copying. 
Commercial motives are also regarded as unacceptable (or at 
least less acceptable) when the copyist is disseminating a work 
derived from the original work without attribution whether or not 
the resulting copy is a perfect substitute for the original work.  In 
cases of “snippet copying” involving unauthorized commercial 
remixing of existing works (category (c)), the profit motives of the 
copyists appear to be significant to the question whether the 
activities should be prohibited. 
The snippet copying cases are problematic because they may 
be “like” traditional piracy but rather than involving a verbatim 
copy of the whole work they are derived from snippets of multiple 
works.  In other words, they may or may not perfectly substitute 
for the original work and are less likely than category (a) cases to 
contain appropriate attribution to original authors.  High profile 
examples of snippet copying cases are Kaavya Viswanathan’s 
novel How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild, and Got a Life in 
the brick-and-mortar publishing world and Jordin Williams 
repurposing snippets of Tammara Webber’s and Jamie McGuire’s 
best-selling self-published romance titles.153  If not for the 
commercialization of these works, there may not have been such 
an outcry against them.  While the repurposed works would have 
involved a lack of attribution to original sources, the lack of 
                                                                                                             
153 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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attribution may not have seemed as egregious or noteworthy if the 
copyist had not been attempting to profit from the resulting work. 
To the extent that the central concern of these cases is about 
unauthorized commercialization, they are similar to the derivative 
works cases that involve unauthorized commercial profit—
category (d) in the above taxonomy.  While it is possible that 
questions of attribution could arise in a derivative works case, in 
many derivative works cases, attribution is express or implied from 
context.  In cases of sequels, prequels, and retellings of an original 
story, the identity of the author of the original work will be 
obvious from the context.  Readers would be less likely to be 
attracted to the new work if not for the existence of, and the 
readers’ familiarity with, the original. 
So, again, as with the category (c) cases, it is the idea of 
making an unauthorized profit from another’s work that may be the 
key concern in many category (d) cases, rather than a concern with 
attribution.  In countries with a robust moral rights jurisprudence, 
these kinds of situations—both categories (c) and (d)—could also 
raise authorial concerns about the right of integrity. 
C. Attribution and Plagiarism 
There is less to say legally, at least in the context of American 
law, about attribution and plagiarism than about transformativeness 
and commercialization.  This is because moral rights are not a part 
of the copyright legislation that applies to literary works,154 and 
plagiarism is not a legal wrong.  However, it is worth briefly 
discussing the relevance of concepts of attribution and plagiarism 
in the literary borrowing context because of their importance with 
respect to the existence of market norms and practices. 
As noted above, allegations of failure to attribute sources and 
plagiarism may be more effective market deterrents to unattributed 
borrowing than a threat of copyright infringement.155  Kaavya 
Viswanathan’s book was quickly recalled, and her publishing deal 
and movie option promptly cancelled, following allegations of 
                                                                                                             
154 The protections of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 do not apply to literary 
works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(A). 
155 See discussion supra Part I.D. 
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plagiarism.156  The threat of copyright infringement, on the other 
hand, may take a much longer time to resolve itself, as it may rely 
on lawyers and litigation rather than on the publisher’s concerns 
about its reputation in the marketplace.  While publishers will not 
be cavalier about a claim of copyright infringement, it does not 
raise the same implications about a commercial party’s honor and 
reputation than an allegation of plagiarism.  Copyright 
infringements are strict-liability wrongs and illegal copying can be 
unconscious on the part of an author, while plagiarism contains 
unambiguous connotations of disreputable practices.157 
The taxonomy illustrates that the situations where concerns 
about attribution and plagiarism come to the fore are typically the 
category (c) “snippet copying” cases like the Viswanathan novel 
and the Jordin Williams e-book.158  These are clear-cut cases in 
which a copyist has drawn from the works of others without 
attribution, but has typically also done so for her own commercial 
benefit—to profit from deceiving the consumer about the true 
provenance of the work.  As noted in the previous sub-part, 
unauthorized commercial benefit seems to be a large part of the 
concern about this kind of borrowing.  There are few situations 
where there has been such an outcry about unattributed borrowing 
in cases where the copyist is not attempting to make a commercial 
profit. 
CONCLUSION 
What conclusions might we draw from the above taxonomy of 
borrowing in the context of literary works?  Hopefully, the 
taxonomy, drawn as it is from actual market practices and legal 
cases, illustrates the most common current concerns of those 
involved in the digital publishing industry.  In so doing, it enables 
us to tease out the key factors that concern authors, copyright 
holders, readers, and others involved with literary texts in the 
digital age.  Copyright law can be rather a blunt instrument 
because of its strict-liability approach to infringing conduct.  
                                                                                                             
156 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
157 See supra Part I.D. 
158 Id. 
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Paradoxically, it can also be somewhat vague in terms of the 
application of the flexible fair use doctrine, giving little ex ante 
guidance as to what classes of borrowing conduct are acceptable.  
Plagiarism, on the other hand, is a matter of honor and reputation 
and does not in and of itself give rise to a legal cause of action or 
an award of damages by way of compensation to the wronged 
party. 
The point of the taxonomy is to draw together key threads from 
Copyright law and plagiarism (with some reference to moral rights 
doctrines in other jurisdictions) to ascertain whether laws, policies, 
and practices related to borrowing from literary texts in the digital 
age can be better streamlined or at least better understood in the 
future.  The aim has not been to suggest dramatic law reform for 
the publishing sector in particular, or for Copyright law in general.  
To the extent that the discussion impacts on future legal 
applications, the idea is to guide participants in the industry and 
judges applying Copyright law to literary works on the key 
considerations that may arise in different situations.  In other 
words, this Article is intended to focus future thinking on the most 
effective ways to apply copyright doctrines, with an emphasis on 
fair use factors one and four, to meet the needs of the digital 
publishing industry.  As conceived in this Article, the publishing 
industry includes both traditional publishers and self-published 
authors. 
A second goal of the discussion has been to help those within 
all segments of the industry to better understand acceptable social 
and market norms with respect to unauthorized borrowing from 
literary texts.  Concepts of plagiarism and attribution are more 
likely to implicate publishers, authors, and consumers, than judges 
and legislators.  Yet, they are of importance to those within the 
industry, and should not be ignored simply because they do not 
give rise to a legal claim. 
From the above discussion, it seems that those involved in the 
various segments of the industry need to better understand when, 
and to what extent, concepts like transformativeness, 
commercialization, and attribution—or lack thereof—will be 
relevant in a given situation, and the interplay between them.  Of 
course, the taxonomy is not exhaustive and there may be conduct 
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that does not neatly fit into the categories set out above or that may 
overlap categories.  The taxonomy may require further explication 
as literary text borrowing practices continue to evolve online. 
It is also important to understand that while copyright laws and 
moral imperatives like plagiarism are relevant and may be applied 
to various sectors of creative endeavors (art, literature, games, 
music, movies, etc.), there are significant benefits to occasionally 
engaging in a sector-specific examination of their application.  
Each field of creative endeavor involves sector-specific concerns 
as well as common concerns.  Interestingly, copyright concerns 
relating to the digitization and self-publishing of literary works are 
relatively new in comparison to those involving other sectors of 
creative endeavor.  The last few years have seen a rash of court 
cases involving the publishing industry, whereas previous decades 
showed comparatively little litigation involving the industry as 
compared with, say, music and movies.159  In light of this fact, the 
time is ripe for a sector-specific examination of the needs of the 
digital publishing industry in the hopes of streamlining and 
clarifying the commercial and moral imperatives underpinning the 
modern industry. 
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